Sunday 8 December 2013

Public Funding for Judicial Review: a Necessary Safeguard


This has been written in response to the recent cuts to criminal legal aid in prison law matters, a summary of which can be read here. This post seeks to explain why public funding for certain civil actions, specifically Judicial Review, is a safeguard for individual freedoms. 

Earlier this year, the Government announced, in keeping with its continued massacre of the publicly funded legal system, that it will now be more difficult for individuals to make applications for a decision made by a public body to be judicially reviewed. The Government has additionally drastically reduced the amount of legal aid available to prisoners pursuing such claims against the prison service and associated bodies.


In relation to these proposals, the Secretary of State for Justice, Chris Grayling has said that "The vast majority of these types of complaint can and should be dealt with by the prison service's complaints system". Unfortunately the reality is that sometimes the prison service fails to address legitimate complaints and sometimes makes arbitrary and often unfair decisions. Equally, decisions that are made in good faith may be wrong in law. For these reasons, an avenue of legal challenge available to all is necessary to ensure that such bodies are held to account for their decisions, and that unlawful decisions are questioned. Public funding for prison law matters is therefore not only necessary to preserve individual rights and liberties, but also to ensure that the State is not acting unlawfully. 


One of the ways prisoners can legally challenge unfair, unlawful or arbitrary decisions made by the prison service is through Judicial Review. Judicial Review is a process which enables government and public bodies such as the Parole Board and Probation Service to be scrutinised by an independent eye, and rightly so. The potential of external scrutiny means that authorities are more likely to make fair and lawful decisions in any event, but equally, it means that mistakes in the process of decision making can be rightfully corrected. The cuts to prison law legal aid will mean that individuals who may have a legitimate claim for Judicial Reviewwill not be able to pursue this unless they can afford the services of lawyers, or have the necessary knowledge of public law and drafting skills to make an application as a self-representing claimant.


Often, complaints made by prisoners raise issues relating to equality and discrimination. Legislation such as the Equality Act 2010 applies to prisoners as it applies to other citizens. The law in this jurisdiction provides that the deprivation of one's liberty is punishment for criminal offences. Prisoners retain the right to be treated fairly and in accordance with prison rules and policy. Punishment does not encompass general infringement on basic rights, access to justice or discrimination at the hands of the prison system. Nor does punishment mean that prisoners may be treated unlawfully. These are all issues which many prisoners' complaints entail. Public funding for prisoners without adequate financial means for this purpose is therefore imperative. Whilst there may be some limited funding for certain exceptional claims which raise human rights issues, the current proposals are draconian and the potential ramifications have not been thought through.


Throughout history, lessons have apparently been learned in relation to prohibiting the ability of individuals to challenge government decisions. The proposed limitations to Judicial Review will have a similar impact in that society’s outcasts will not be able to challenge decisions which may not only be unreasonable, but illegal. To limit the mechanism of Judicial Review on multiple fronts, including both eligibility of applications andfunding for legal representation on such applications, will prove to be a very dangerous move indeed.

Changes to legal aid for prison law matters (in force as of 02 December 2013)

Below is a guide to the changes to criminal legal aid for prison law issues. 

In summary, criminal legal aid for prison law matters has changed in relation to the following areas:

(1) Treatment;
(2) Sentencing;
(3) Parole Board hearings;
(4) Adjudications.

Treatment 

"Treatment" encompasses the following:

  • Communication;
  • Visits;
  • Living conditions.


There will no longer be any criminal legal aid for these matters. The Ministry of Justice advises that these grievances should be resolved by the Form COMP process.

Sentencing

The following still falls within the scope of criminal legal aid:


  • Release date calculation issues;
  • Parole Board reference issues (for indeterminate sentenced prisoners who are seeking release).


The following has been removed from the scope of criminal legal aid:


  • Categorisation issues for Category B and below prisoners.


Parole Board hearings

Parole Board hearings fall within the scope of criminal legal aid only in those cases where the Board has the power to direct release. Hearings where the Board merely has the power to recommend transfer to open conditions without the power to direct release are no longer covered by criminal legal aid.

Adjudications

Criminal legal aid is now only available for the following disciplinary issues:

(1) If the case involves a criminal allegation and is referred to an Independent Adjudicator or;
(2) In Governor only hearings where the Governor decides that the Tarrant criteria is met and the prisoner requires legal representation. (Information on the Tarrant criteria can be found here)

New CRM3 form for solicitors etc

As of 11 December, this is the form to fill in if you are applying for legal aid for Parole and Adjudication representation: http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/forms/legal-aid/crime-forms/crm3-version-11-december-2013.pdf

Monday 2 December 2013

Imprisonment For Public Protection and Licence After Release

Whilst the controversial IPP sentence has now been abolished courtesy of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, there are thousands of individuals still serving this sentence, and many more individuals on IPP licence after having been released from prison.

Individuals who were sentenced to IPP, and subsequently released, potentially remain on licence for the rest of their lives. However, such offenders can apply for an IPP licence to be cancelled after ten years. The consequence of this is that upon successful application, the individual will not be liable to recall to custody as he would have been had he been on a life licence. 

In order for an IPP licence to be discharged, an application must be made to the Public Protection Unit. A specialist legal practitioner in this field can assist with this. When considering whether or not the licence should be discharged, the PPU will seek advice from the Parole Board. 

Wednesday 20 November 2013

R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Zulfikar [1996] COD 256

Citation: R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Zulfikar [1996] COD 256

Decision

Ex parte Zulfikar established certain principles which should be adopted by the Parole Board when a prisoner comes before it seeking a progressive move to open conditions and/ or ultimately release. Those principles are as follows:

  1. Each case is decided upon its own merits and its own facts;
  2. There is a presumption that the prisoner before it has been properly convicted, i.e. he was in fact guilty of the index offence;
  3. The Parole Board must take into account any denial of guilt from the part of the prisoner;
  4. The Board must also take into account if the prisoner has refused to participate in offending behaviour programmes in order to address his risk;
  5. However, release cannot be refused purely because the prisoner denies his guilt, although in practice it is easy to see how denial makes a demonstration of risk reduction more difficult (i.e. a denier cannot demonstrate remorse for the offending, and there may also be difficulties in effectively engaging with offending behaviour courses).



Tuesday 19 November 2013

R (oao Smith and West) v Parole Board [2005] UKHL 1

Citation: R (oao Smith and West) v Parole Board [2005] UKHL 1

Decision

Smith and West is authority for the principle that the Parole Board has a common law duty to ensure its procedure is fair when considering whether recalled prisoners should be re-released. In order to decide the matter of re-release fairly, an oral hearing may be required. If a prisoner is unfairly refused an oral hearing, his rights under Article 5 may be engaged and he may be entitled to claim damages.

R (Palmer) v Home Secretary [2004] EWHC 1817 (Admin)

Citation: R (Palmer) v Home Secretary [2004] EWHC 1817 (Admin)

Court: High Court (Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court)

Decision

When a prisoner is recategorised to a higher secuirty category, he must be given reasons why he has been recategorised.

This principle was restated in Palmer. The reason for this is if a prisoners wishes to appeal a decision as to his categorisation, he must know, as far as possible, the reasons why the decision was made in order that he may deal with allegations against him.

Collins J further stated that:

"He may, of course, not necessarily know the precise source of the information which is relevant to risk because, as is obvious, such information may come from informants, it may come from confidential police sources, or otherwise it may be necessary, in order to protect third parties, that the prisoner does not know the details."

Nevertheless, reasons must be given, whilst the source of the information giving rise to those reasons need not.

R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, ex parte Leech [1988] A.C. 533.

Citation: R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, ex parte Leech [1988] A.C. 533.
 
Decision
 
When deciding whether judicial review is the appropriate remedy for a prisoner's grievance, his advisor should consider whether he has exhausted all other remedies. The most common of these is the prison's internal complaints system through usage of the COMP and COMP1 forms. Alternatively, a prisoner may choose to make a complaint to the Prison and Probation Ombudsman ('PPO'). However, it must be noted that the PPO does not constitute a remedy for judicial review purposes, as was explained in ex parte Leech by Lord Bridge (at 561 - 564). This is for the simple reason that the PPO's recommendations are not binding.
 
 
 

Monday 18 November 2013

R (oao Potter) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWHC Admin 1401

Citation: R (on the application of Potter) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWHC Admin 1401

Court: High Court (Queen's Bench Division, Administrative Court)

Decision

Potter relates to the Incentives and Earned Privileges Scheme in prisons, which you can read about here.

Essentially, Potter clarified that the IEP scheme is not to be used to punish prisoners. It is not a form of discipline. Punitive use of the IEP system will render the decision as to a particular prisoner's IEP status vulnerable to challenge, either by written representations from the prisoner's solicitor, or ultimately through judicial review. Similarly, if a prisoner has been adhering to criteria relating to a certain privilege, taking that privilege away may constitute grounds for judicial review on the basis that the prisoner had a legitimate exception.

Walker v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 30

Citation: Walker v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 30

Court: Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

Decision

In Walker, the Court of Appeal held that the Prison Service's failure to provide sufficient offending behaviour programmes was arbitrary and unreasonable, and therefore unlawful. This is of utmost relevance to prisoners serving indeterminate sentences whose release depends on risk reduction which in turn is largely dependent on the completion of such courses. The Court further held that whilst pre-tariff detention is for the punishment of offenders, detention after expiry of the minimum term is to protect the public from those who still pose a risk. Detention past the expiry of the minimum is only justifiable if the prisoner is still dangerous.


Saturday 16 November 2013

R (on the application of Noorkoiv) -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 1 WLR 3284

Citation: R (on the application of Noorkoiv) -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 1 WLR 3284

Court: Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

Decision

This decision is of relevance:


  1. Post-release (i.e. to recalled prisoners) and;
  2. Pre-release.


Once the Secretary of State has revoked an individual's licence, and he has subsequently been recalled to custody, the recalled prisoner should be brought before the Parole Board as quickly as possible. If not, Article 5(4) ECHR could be infringed. The lack of the Parole Board's recourses or administrative difficulties cannot justify a breach of Art. 5(4).

The principle also applies to prisoners who have served their minimum term (i.e prior to initial release). In this particular case, the appellant's Parole Board review did not occur until two months after the expiry of his minimum term. The court held that this delay amounted to a breach Art. 5(4). This is because the purpose of pre-release reviews is to determine whether the individual can be lawfully detained after the expiry of the minimum term.

R (on the application of Shutt & Tetley) v Secretary of State for Justice [2012] EWHC 851 (Admin)

Citation: R (on the application of Shutt & Tetley) v Secretary of State for Justice [2012] EWHC 851 (judgment can be found here:



Court: Administrative Court (High Court, Queen's Bench Division).












Decision





It was held in R (on the application of Shutt & Tetley) v Secretary of State for Justice [2012] EWHC 851 that a local Incentives and Earned Privileges Policy ("IEP") policy which precluded individuals who maintained their innocence from ever achieving "Enhanced" level on the scheme was unlawful.



This means that IEP policies must be drafted in such a way that prisoners who deny their offending should not automatically be excluded from gaining Enhanced status by virtue of their denial. In other words, a blanket ban is unlawful.



It should be noted however that in Shutt & Tetley, no injustice was found to these particular claimants themselves. This was for the following reasons:

  1. The claimants were later assessed for the Sex Offender Treatment Programme and found suitable but not ready for the course, because of their denial and;
  2. The claimants' OASys reports indicated that nothing more pressing needed to be done.